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Abstract 
This research applies the latest formal technique for human error prediction - Human 
Error Template (HET) - to evaluate standard operating procedures for performing a 
go-around in a large commercial transport aircraft.  HET was originally developed in 
response to the requirement for formal methods to assess compliance with the new 
large civil aircraft human factors certification rule introduced to reduce the incidence 
of design-induced error on the flight deck (EASA Certification Specification 
25.1302). A total of 67 Aircraft B pilots participated in this study including 25 
captains and 42 first officers. This research finds that there are three types of errors 
with high likelihood committed by pilots during performing go-around, ‘Fail to 
execute’; ‘Task execution incomplete’; and ‘Task executed too late’.  Therefore, there is a 
raising need to investigate further impact to flight safety for such errors occurred.  
Many of the errors that were found were the types of errors that most pilots were 
aware of and have simply had to accept on the flight deck. It is hoped that human 
factors certification standards would help to ensure that many of these errors are not 
included on future aircraft. 
 
Key Words: Design Induced Human Errors, Hierarchical Task Analysis, Human Error 
Identification, Standard Operation Procedures
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Introduction  
 
For the past thirty years there has been a steady decline in the commercial aircraft 
accident rate.  However, over the last two decades it has been noticeable that the 
serious accident rate has remained relatively constant at approximately one per 
million departures at American/European (Boeing, 2000).  If this accident rate 
remains unchanged, with the currently increase in the demand on flight services for 
travel, it will means that there will be one major accident almost every week by the 
year 2015.  As the reliability and structural integrity of aircraft has improved, the 
number of accidents directly resulting from such failures has reduced dramatically, 
hence so has the overall number of accidents.  However, the reliability of human 
beings has not improved to the same.  Figures vary but it is estimated that up to 75% 
of all aircraft accidents now have a major human factors component.  Human error is 
now the primary risk to flight safety (CAA, 1998).  
 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) have analyzed 240 member airlines 
and found about 50% of airline accidents took place during the phrases of final 
approach and landing in 2007, in which only covers 4% of the total flight time. Many 
of those accidents could have been avoided if pilots made a second attempt at the 
runway, or if obstacles on the ground were properly cleared, according to a safety 
report by the Geneva-based industry group. Most pilots are taught that executing a 
go-around is the prudent course of action if the landing is not progressing normally 
and a safe outcome is not assured. That is a good practice but it isn't always that 
simple. The pilot must be proficient in executing the go-around properly in the 
particular airplane being flown and must make the decision to execute the go around 
in a timely manner. Pilot’s decision on whether to execute a go-around is rather 
important, sometimes might be life saving. Knowing how to execute the go-around 
maneuver and being proficient at it are extremely important but still more is required. 
Pilots must possess the skill and knowledge to decide when to execute a go-around. 
Many accidents have happened because the pilot waited too long before deciding to 
abort the landing.  The Human Error Template (HET) is a new formal approach to 
predict human errors, especially during the design stages of the flight deck to help 
prevent design-induced error leading to accidents. Therefore, the purpose of this 
research is to identify human errors occurred during go-around in a large commercial 
aircraft for developing accident prevention strategies (Li & Harris, 2009).   
 
Literature Review 
 
The roots of human error are manifold and have complex interaction with all aspects 
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of the operation of a modern aircraft.  However, during the last decade ‘design 
induced’ error has been a factor of key concern for the airworthiness authorities, 
particularly in the new generations of highly automated aircraft. Chapanis (1999) 
noted that back in the 1940s that many aspects of ‘pilot error’ were really ‘designer 
error’.  This was a challenge to the contemporary viewpoint at the time and but 
demonstrates that good design is all-important in human error reduction.  New 
generation, modern technology aircraft have implemented automated systems and 
computerized cockpits.  However, human factors accidents have become the most 
significant concern of researchers in the aviation industry.  According to accident 
investigation reports, inappropriate system design, incompatible cockpit display 
layout, and unsuitable SOPs were the major factors causing accidents（Stanton & 
Baber, 2002）.  The approach focuses upon the identification and classification of the 
errors that operators made at the so-called ‘sharp-end’ of system operation, and seeks 
to identify the internal or psychological factors (e.g. inattention, loss of vigilance and 
carelessness) involved in error occurrence. According to the person approach errors 
arise from aberrant mental processes such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor 
motivation, carelessness, negligence, and recklessness (Reason, 1990).  Li & Harris 
(2006 & 2007) found that 30% of accidents relevant to ‘violations’ included 
intentionally ignoring standard operating procedures (SOPs); neglecting SOPs; 
applying improper SOPs; and diverting from SOPs.  Dekker (2001) has proposed 
that human errors are systematically connected to features of operators’ tools and 
tasks, and that error has its roots in the surrounding system: the question of human or 
system failure alone demonstrates an oversimplified view of the roots of failure.  The 
important issue in a human factors investigation is to understand why pilots’ actions 
made sense to them at the time the accident happened.  
 
Initial efforts to enhance aircraft safety were aimed at system reliability, structural 
integrity and aircraft dynamics.  Human Error Identification（HEI）techniques are 
used to predict potential human or operator error in complex, dynamic systems. A 
number of different types of HEI approach were identified, including taxonomy based 
techniques, error identifier techniques, error quantification techniques, cognitive 
modeling techniques and cognitive simulation techniques. HEI techniques have 
previously been employed in a number of different domains, including the Nuclear 
power and petrol-chemical processing industry (Kirwan, 1994), air traffic control 
(Shorrock & Kirwan, 2002), aviation (Marshall et al, 2003), naval operations, military 
systems, space operations (Nelson et al, 1998), medicine and public technology 
(Baber & Stanton, 1996). The utility of HEI techniques lies in their ability to identify 
potential errors before they occur, allowing pro-active remedial measures to be taken. 
This also allows them to be applied early in the design process, before an operational 
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system actually exists.  Human Error Template (HET) is a checklist style approach to 
error prediction that comes in the form of an error pro forma containing twelve error 
modes. The HET methodology is applied to each bottom level task step in a 
hierarchical task analysis (HTA) of the task in question.  The technique requires the 
analyst to indicate which of the HET error modes are credible for each task step, the 
probability of error and the criticality of error, based upon their judgment for 
developing effective accident prevention strategies （Harris, Stanton, Marshall, 
Young, Demagalski & Salmon, 2005）.  
 
The HET error taxonomy consists of 12 basic error modes that were selected based 
upon a study of actual pilot error incidence and existing error modes. For each 
credible error the analyst provides a description of the form that the error would take.  
The analyst has to determine the outcome or consequence associated with the error 
and estimates the likelihood of the error using three levels, low, medium or high; and 
the criticality of the error using three levels, low, medium or high.  If the error is 
given a high rating for both likelihood and criticality, the aspect of the interface 
involved in that task step is then rated as a ‘fail’, meaning that it is not suitable for 
certification.  The main advantages of the HET method are that it is simple to learn 
and use, requiring very little training and it is also designed to be a convenient method 
to apply in a field study.  The error taxonomy used is comprehensive as it is based on 
existing error taxonomies from a number of HEI methods.  The HET method is also 
easily auditable as it comes in the form of an error pro forma (Stanton, Salmon, 
Walker, Baber & Jenkins, 2005).   
 
The high levels of automation in the new generation airliners have without a doubt 
offered considerable advances in safety over their forbearers, however new types of 
error have begun to emerge on these flight decks. This was exemplified by accidents 
such as the Nagoya Airbus A300-600 accident, where the pilots could not disengage 
the go-around mode after inadvertent activation as a result of a combination of lack of 
understanding of the automation and poor design of the operating logic in the 
auto-land system. The airworthiness regulations governing the design of commercial 
aircraft, for example Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) part 25: Airworthiness 
Standards still reflect these earlier concerns.  As aircraft’s reliability and structural 
integrity have improved over the last 50 years, the number of accidents resulting from 
such failures has reduced dramatically.  However, there were up to 75% of all 
aircraft accidents have a human factors component in them.  Human error is now the 
primary risk to flight safety (Civil Aviation Authority, 1998).  It would appear that 
the human component is now the most ‘unreliable’ component in the system.  Li, 
Harris & Yu (2008) suggested that to reduce accident rate the ‘paths to failure’ relating 
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to those organizational influence and human factors must be addressed. Shackel 
(1990) advised a definition of usability comprising effectiveness (level of 
performance), learn ability (the amount of training and time taken to achieve the 
defined level of effectiveness) and attitude (the associated costs and satisfaction). 
These criteria together with comprehensiveness, accuracy, consistency, theoretical 
validity, usefulness and acceptability (Kirwan, 1992), could be used to assess HEI 
techniques in a systematic and quantifiable manner. 
 
Reason (1990) proposed that human behavior is governed by the interplay between 
psychological and situational factors.  Human error is a problem of great concern 
within complex sociotechnical systems and has consistently been implicated in a high 
proportion of accidents and incidents. Recognizing that most accidents are caused by 
human error, industry and government both have focused resources on studying 
human-factor issues in recent years. While ongoing, these efforts already have 
produced improvements in training, in the design of flight decks and in the 
management of tasks in the cockpit.  Sherry et al. (2001) advised that having 
multiple modes on the same control interface is unwise and can lead to mode 
confusion and design-induced errors. 
 
Method 
 
The methodology applied in this research is to identify Aircraft B pilots’ operational 
behavior and the consequence during go-around based on the method of Human Error 
Template (HET).  It is applied hierarchical task analysis (HTA) to decomposition the 
task to each bottom level task step in question.  The technique requires the analyst to 
indicate which of error modes are credible for each task step, the probability of error 
and the criticality of error, based upon their judgment. Hierarchical task analysis 
involves identifying tasks, collecting task data, analyzing the data, and producing a 
documented representation of the analyzed tasks, such as standard operation 
procedures (Annett, Duncan and Stammers, 1971). Typically HTA method is used for 
understanding the required human-machine and human-human interactions, and for 
breaking down task into component task steps or physical operation.  According to 
Annett (2005) a survey of defense task analysis studies demonstrated its significant 
use in system analysis, manpower analysis interface design, operability assessment 
and training specification. The purpose for this research was to evaluate the potential 
risks and interactions between the design of Aircraft B standard operation procedures 
and pilots during go-around. 
 
1. Participants: A total of 67 Aircraft B pilots involved in this study.  The age ranges 
Li, Hsu, Chang, Wang & Harris                                                         6 
of participants were between 28 and 60.  There were 25 captains and 42 first 
officers.  Participants volunteered to take part in the study and consisted of 62 
male and 5 female airline pilots. 
2. Define tool and task: The first step in conducting a HTA is to clearly identify the 
task under analysis and to define the task under analysis. The purpose of the task 
analysis for this study is reviewing the Aircraft B standard operations procedures 
and pilots’ reactions during go-around.  
3. Go-around Task decomposition: Once the overall task goal has been specified, the 
next step is to break this overall goal down into meaningful sub-goals (usually 
four or five items), which together form the tasks required to achieve the overall 
goal. In the task, ‘Aircraft B safely operation for go-around’, the overall goal of 
operating Aircraft B aircraft go-around was broken down into the sub-goals, for 
example, 1.1 Press TO/GA Switches; 1.2 Set Flaps Lever to 20; 1.3 Rotate to 
go-around Attitude; 1.4 Verify Thrust Increase; and 1.8 Follow Miss Approach 
Procedures.  
The analysis of task goal should break down the sub-goals. This process should go 
on until an appropriate operation is reached. The bottom level of any branch in a 
HTA should always be an operation. Whilst everything above an operation 
specifies goals, operations actually specifically what needs to be done. Therefore 
go-around operations are actions to be made by an agent in order to achieve the 
associated goal and based on the SOPs (Table 1). For example, in the HTA of the 
flight task ‘Aircraft B safely operation for go-around’, the sub-goal 1.6 Select Roll 
Mode is broken down into the following operations: 1.6.1 Select Roll Mode; 1.6.2 
Verify Roll Mode Annunciation; and 1.6.3 Turn into Correct Track (see Figure 1).  
4. Modes of Error: Within the 8 sub goals for Aircraft B performing go-around 
safely, there are contained 17 bottom level tasks shown as the sub-goals 
underlined in figure 1. These bottom level tasks are broken down into 65 
operational items evaluated by all participants.  There are 12 basic error modes 
based on Human Error Template （Harris, Stanton, Marshall, Young, Demagalski 
& Salmon, 2005）as following, “Failure to execute”, “Task execution incomplete”, 
“Task executed in the wrong direction”, “Wrong task executed”, “Task repeated”, 
“Task executed on the wrong interface element”, “Task executed too early”, “Task 
executed too late”, “Task executed too much”, “Task executed too little”, 
“Misread Information”, and “Others”.   
5. The design of evaluating format: The questionnaire of 65 operational items was to 
ask participants if they had ever made the reported error (tick ‘ME’) and if they 
knew of anyone else who had made the error rather than rate the frequency with 
which they believed the error had occurred (tick ‘OTHER’). It was also hoped that 
this increased the participant’s confidence in being able to report errors. If they 
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had made the error themselves but had no desire to admit making the error, they 
could tick the “OTHERS” box and the research team would still get a mark that 
the error had been made during performing go-around.  
 
Table 1: Aircraft B Go-Around Procedures 
 
“GO-AROUND” - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ANNOUNCE 
A Go-Around is a normal procedure which should be applied without hesitation if 
required. If using manual throttle the command GO-AROUND” means set Go Around 
thrust. 
PF PM 
TO/GA Switches PUSH* 
Commands “FLAPS TWENTY” 
Verify speed above Bug speed. 
Repeats “FLAPS TWENTY” and selects 
Flaps 20. 
Verify rotation to Go Around attitude and thrust increase (FMA indication THR or THR 
REF) 
 “ GO-AROUND THRUST SET” 
Positive climb (VSI and RA) command: 
“GEAR UP” 
Verify positive climb (VSI and RA) repeat: 
“GEAR UP” 
and place Gear Lever to UP. 
Above 400 feet AAL select a Roll Mode 
by selecting LNAV or HDG SEL or when 
flying manually by commanding: 
“LNAV” or  “HDG SEL” 
Engage commanded Roll Mode. 
 
Above 1,000 feet AAL select a Pitch 
Mode VNAV, FLCH or V-SPEED or 
when flying manually by commanding: 
“VNAV” or 
“FLCH” or 
“VERTICAL SPEED” 
Engage commanded Pitch Mode. 
 
Follow published missed approach 
procedure or ATC clearance. 
Advise ATC. 
 
* A single push on the TO/GA switches provides thrust for approximately 2,000 ft/min 
rate of climb. FMA indicates THR. A second push on the TO/GA switches gives full 
thrust and THR REF on the FMA. 
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Aircraft B Go-Around procedures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Example of SOPs for Aircraft B Performing Go-around Safely by HTA 
 
Result and Discussion 
 
The participants had evaluated 17 operational steps for performing go-around which 
each step consisted by 12 different types of human errors.  A total of 67 Aircraft B 
pilots participated in this research including 57 national pilots and ten expatriate 
pilots. There were 25 captains and 42 first officers by job description.  The range of 
pilots’ age between 25 and 60, there were half of pilots (34 participants) between 31 
and 40 years old. The training background of pilots included 38 Ab-initio pilots, 15 
ex-military pilots, ten other background pilots, and four CPL pilots (pilots who 
acquired Commercial Pilot License before entering the company). The flying 
experience of participants were 21 pilots above 10,000 hours, 18 pilots between 5,000 
and 9,999 hours, 17 pilots between 2,000 and 4,999 hours, 11 pilots below 1,999 
flying hours. There were 30 instructor pilots and 37 first officers by teaching 
experience. 
 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show the result of operational step 1.1 Press TO/GA Switches 
which contains two sub-goals, ‘1.1.1 Press TO/GA switches’ and ‘1.1.2 Thrust has 
advanced’.  The first operational step indicates there were 34% of ‘Fail to execute’; 
27% of ‘Task execution incomplete’; and 25% of ‘Task executed too late’.  The second 
1.1 
Press 
TO/GA 
Switches  
1.2 
Set flaps 
lever to 20 
  
1.3 
Rotate to 
go-around 
attitude 
1.4 
Verify 
Thrust 
Increase 
1.5 
Gear up 
1.6 
Select Roll  
mode 
1.7 
Select 
Pitch mode 
1.8 
Follow 
Miss 
Approach 
Procedures 
1.2.1 
Command 
〝flap 20〞 
1.2.2 
Place flap 
lever to 20 
1.3.1 
Verify 
TO/GA 
mode 
annunciation 
 
1.3.2 
Rotate to 
proper pitch 
attitude 
1.4.1 
Verify 
adequate 
thrust for 
go-around 
1.4.2 
Announce 
〝go-around〞 
〝thrust set〞 
1.6.1 
Select Roll 
mode 
 
1.6.2 
Verify Roll 
mode 
annunciation 
 
1.7.1 
Select Pitch 
mode 
1.7.2 
Verify pitch 
mode 
annunciation 
 
1.1.1 
Press TO/GA 
Switches  
 
1.1.2 
Thrust has 
advanced 
1.5.1 
Verify 
positive rate 
of climb 
1.5.2 
Place gear 
lever up 
1.7.3 
Maintain 
proper pitch 
attitude 
 
1.6.3 
Turn into 
correct track 
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operational step reveals there were 27% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 48% of ‘Task 
execution incomplete’.  There are including 8 questions (Q1 to Q8) related to errors 
occurred at this stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ 
shown as Table 2.  The results show that accidents may occur during go-around 
caused by not having enough lift due to lack of thrust. Takeoff/Go-around (TO/GA) 
Switches are designed for activating Auto-throttle system. Pushing either one of the 
TO/GA switches activates go-around. PF (pilot flight) presses TO/GA switches during 
go-around and advance thrust lever automatically or manually. PM (pilot monitor) 
verifies Auto-throttle system is being activated during go-around and monitor 
advanced thrust lever.  With the first push of the TO/GA switch, Auto-throttle system 
activates in thrust to establish a 2000 FPM (feet/minute) climb. With the second push 
of the TO/GA switch, Auto-throttle system activates in thrust reference (THR REF) at 
full go-around thrust. Failed to press TO/GA switches may cause aircraft climbing 
without thrust and caused serious consequences. Failed to press TO/GA switch will 
not activate go-around thrust and flight director will display wrong pitch guidance to 
confuse pilots’ following decision and may cause serious consequences. When 
pressed TO/GA switches, PF should check whether thrust lever is moving forward in 
case of system malfunction. Rotation without adding go-around thrust will cause 
aircraft to lose airspeed; it is possible to go into stall. 
 
 
Table 2: The occurred rate of errors break down by detail operational steps for 
Aircraft B Performing Go-around 
 
Operational Steps of 
Go-around Procedures 
Description of Errors 
Occurred during Go-Around 
Occurrence rate Modes of Error 
ME OTHER 
Operational Step 1.1 
Press TO/GA Switches 
Q1. Failed to press TO/GA 
switch due to pilot’s negligence. 
20.90% 53.73% Fail to execute 
Q4. Accidentally pressed TO/GA 
switch during normal approach 
29.85% 44.78% Wrong task execute 
Q5. Failed to check thrust level 38.81% 56.72% Fail to execute 
Q8.Thrust lever were not 
advanced manually when the 
auto-throttles became inoperative 
29.85% 53.73% Task execute 
incomplete 
Operational Step 1.2  
Set Flaps Lever to 20 
Q9. Failed to command “flap 20” 
due to pilot’s negligence  
25.37% 67.16% Fail to execute 
Q14. Forgot to place flap lever to 
20 until being reminded 
16.42% 50.75% Fail to execute 
Operational Step 1.3 
Rotate to Go-around 
Attitude 
Q15. Failed to check whether 
TO/GA mode was being activated 
44.78% 46.27% Fail to execute 
Q17. Late rotation, over / under 
rotation. 
46.27% 50.75% Task execute too late 
Q18. No check for primary flight 
display 
26.87% 56.72% Task execute 
incomplete 
Operational Step 1.4 
Verify Thrust Increase 
Q23. Failed to check go-around 
thrust setting 
53.73% 52.24% Fail to execute 
Q25. Did not identify and correct 
speed deviations on time 
46.27% 47.76% Task execute too late 
Q26. Forgot to call “go-around 
thrust set” 
68.66% 70.15% Fail to execute 
Q27. Did not identify and correct 35.82% 58.21% Task execute too late 
Li, Hsu, Chang, Wang & Harris                                                         10 
go-around thrust deviations on 
time 
Operational Step 1.5 
Gear Up 
Q28. Did not check for positive 
climb indications before calling 
“gear up” 
13.43% 55.22% Task execute 
incomplete 
Q30. Forgot to put the landing 
gear up until being reminded  
40.30% 59.70% Fail to execute 
Operational Step 1.6 
Select Roll Mode 
Q33. Did not engage LNAV 
mode on time failed to capture 
49.25% 58.21% Task execute too late 
Q37 Failed to check whether 
LNAV/ HDG was being activated 
31.34% 64.18% Fail to execute 
Q39. Mixed up the IAS/HDG 
bugs on the MCP  
34.33% 49.25% Task execute on 
wrong interface 
elements 
Operational Step 1.7 
Select Pitch Mode 
Q42. Did not engage VNAV 
mode on time failed to capture 
44.78% 62.96% Fail to execute 
Q46. No check whether VNAV or 
FLCH was being activated 
38.81% 56.72% Task execute 
incomplete 
Q48. Did not monitor the altitude 
at appropriate time 
38.81% 55.22% Task execute 
incomplete 
Operational Step 1.8 
Follow Miss Approach 
Procedures 
Q56. Entered the wrong altitude 
on the MCP and activated it 
29.85% 41.79% Task execute on 
wrong interface 
elements 
Q57. Failed to anticipate flight 
director commands when 
intercepting miss approach 
altitude 
16.42% 41.79% Fail to execute  
Q62 Poor or slow instrument 
scan 
43.28% 55.22% Task execute too late 
Q65. Not using auto-flight 
system when available and 
appropriate. 
55.22% 65.67% Task execute too 
little 
 
 
The operational step of 1.2 Set Flaps Lever to 20 consists of ‘1.2.1 Command flap 20’, 
and ‘1.2.2 Place flap lever to 20’.  Pilots’ operational step of the former advises there 
were 43% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 43% of ‘Task executed too late’; the latter shows 
there were 20% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 20% of ‘Task executed too late’ (Figure 1 and 
Table 1).  There are including 6 questions (Q9 to Q14) related to errors occurred at 
this stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 
2.  The climb gradient performance is determined by thrust and lift. Flap is usually 
set at 30 for landing. When executing a go-around, retract flap to 20 position can 
reduce drag and increase lift during go-around. On Aircraft B flight deck, there is a 
“Flap Gate” which is designed to prevent inadvertent retraction of flaps to past 
go-around position.  When PF commands “flap 20” during go-around should spoke 
loudly and clearly, PM should place flap lever to 20 immediately.  The common 
errors including unclear command by PF will cause confusion or delay PM’s proper 
operation; misunderstanding between crew members, and it may cause incidents or 
accidents. 
 
The operational step of 1.3 Rotate to Go-around Attitude consists of ‘1.3.1 Verify TO/GA 
mode annunciation’ and ‘1.3.2 Rotate to proper pitch attitude’.  Pilots’ operational 
step of the former advises there were 48% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 27% of ‘Task 
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execution incomplete’; the latter shows there were 40% of ‘Task execution incomplete’; 
25% of ‘Task executed too late’; and 36% of ‘Task executed too much’ (Figure 1 and 
Table 1).  There are including 8 questions (Q15 to Q22) related to errors occurred at 
this stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 
2.  The results reveal that Aircraft B installed two primary flight displays (PFDs) on 
instrument panel and they present dynamic color displays of parameters necessary for 
flight path control.  PFDs provide clear go-around information when pilot pressed 
the TO/GA switch.  Go-around initial climb performance depends on sufficient thrust 
and proper rotating rate. Late / early rotation, over / under rotation may cause airspeed 
too fast or too slow. Over rotation occurs most frequently during go around.  When 
PF performed go-around both pilots must verify TO/GA mode annunciation on the 
PFDs. PF should rotate the control column to Go-around attitude and increases the 
thrust simultaneously. If pilots operate too early and over rotation will affect more on 
flight safety, such as pulled back too much on the control column will cause airspeed 
drop dramatically, it may cause aircraft into stall. Rotation before adding go-around 
thrust will cause aircraft to lose airspeed, it is possible to cause stall. 
 
The operational step of 1.4 Verify Thrust Increase consists of ‘1.4.1 Verify adequate 
thrust for go-around’ and ‘1.4.2 Announce go-around thrust set’.  Pilots’ operational 
step of the former advises there were 54% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 39% of ‘Task 
execution incomplete’; the latter shows there were 63% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 27% of 
‘Task execution incomplete’ (Figure 1 and Table 1). N1 (Engine low speed compressor) 
and EPR (engine pressure ratio) are primary engine indications and always display on 
primary EICAS (Engine indication and crew alerting system). Normally go-around 
thrust is around 104.7 % N1 (CF6 engine) or EPR1.51 (PW4056 engine) which 
appears on primary engine indications. There are including 5 questions (Q23 to Q27) 
related to errors occurred at this stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ 
or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 2.  The common errors including wrong EPR or N1 
setting does not happen when auto thrust system being used, it only happens when 
pilot controls thrust manually. Standard callout should be loud and clear. PF should 
closely monitor adequate thrust for go-around. When go-around thrust is set, PM 
should call “go-around thrust set’.  Good teamwork can assure flight safety.  Less 
go-around thrust setting will cause airspeed decreased. If airspeed is below target 
speed, pilot should add thrust immediately. Improper airspeed at this stage will cause 
stall or over flap operation limit. If airspeed is below target speed, pilot should correct 
it immediately. 
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The operational step of 1.5 Gear Up consists of ‘1.5.1 Verify positive rate of climb’ and 
‘1.5.2 Place gear lever up’. Pilots’ operational step of the former advises there were 
32% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 23% of ‘Task executed too late’; the latter shows there 
were 39% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 42% of ‘Task executed too late’ (Figure 1 and Table 
1). There are including 5 questions (Q28 to Q32) related to errors occurred at this 
stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 2.  
Aircraft must remain above the positive rate of climb before retracting gear. The 
landing gear is controlled by the landing gear lever. When the landing gear lever is 
moved up, the landing gear begins to retract and automatic breaking occurs. After 
retraction, the main gear is held in up position by uplocks. PM should make sure 
aircraft remains a positive rate of climb before retracting gear.  PF commands “gear 
up”, PM rechecks gear.  If pilot forgets to put the landing gear up, it will cause lots 
of drag and decrease the climb gradient performance. Giving incorrect command by 
PF will cause misunderstanding between crew members, and it may cause serious 
consequences. If pilot retracts gear when aircraft stays at a negative rate of climb, it 
will trigger GPWS warning.  
 
The operational step of 1.6 Select Roll Mode consists of ‘1.6.1 Select roll mode’; ‘1.6.2 
Verify roll mode annunciation’; and ‘1.6.3 Turn into correct track’.  Pilots’ first 
operational step advises there were 27% of ‘Fail to execute’; and 52% of ‘Task 
executed too late’; pilots’ second operational step advises there were 36% of ‘Fail to 
execute’; and 23% of ‘Task execution incomplete’; pilots’ third operational step shows 
there were 29% of ‘Task execution incomplete’; and 41% of ‘Task executed too late’ 
(Figure 1 and Table 1).  There are including 9 questions (Q33 to Q41) related to 
errors occurred at this stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or 
‘OTHER’ shown as Table 2. The MCP (Mode control panel) provides control of the 
autopilot, flight director, altitude alert, and auto-throttle systems. The MCP selects and 
activates AFDS (Auto flight display system) modes (roll mode and pitch mode) and 
establishes altitudes, speeds, and climb/descent profiles. There are 14 switches or 
selector install on MCP panel. Most modes activate with single push. Roll modes 
include LNAV (Lateral navigation) and HDG (Heading) switches. PF uses roll modes 
(HDG or LNAV) to turn the airplane into the correct track. PM should monitor 
closely. When autopilot is engaged, PF selects a Roll Mode of LNAV or HDG SEL. 
When flying manually, PF calls out “LNAV” or “HDG SEL” and PM selects the 
commanded roll mode. Late or forget to engage LNAV will cause aircraft unable to 
capture the planning track. It may cause ATC violation. Failed to engage LNAV will 
cause aircraft unable to capture the planning track. If LNAV is disengaged by mistake, 
it should be reengaged right away in order to heading the right direction. Pilots should 
closely monitor the change of annunciation.  During go-around aircraft should 
Li, Hsu, Chang, Wang & Harris                                                         13 
follow miss approach procedure or ATC instruction. Either LNAV or HDG is selected, 
pilot should monitor flight director commands to be sure aircraft intercepting miss 
approach course.  Mixed up the IAS/HDG bugs on the MCP is the most common 
mistake made by pilots operating MCP. If the mistake has not been detected it may 
cause airspeed decreased or turn onto wrong heading. 
 
The operational step of 1.7 Select Pitch Mode consists of ‘1.7.1 Select pitch mode’; 
‘1.7.2 Verify pitch mode annunciation’; and ‘1.7.3 Maintain proper pitch attitude’.  
Pilots’ first operational step advises there were 23% of ‘Fail to execute’; 27% of ‘Task 
execution incomplete’; and 50% of ‘Task executed too late’; pilots’ second operational 
step advises there were 27% of ‘Fail to execute’; 27% of ‘Task execution incomplete’; 
and 21% of ‘Task executed too late’; pilots’ third operational step shows there were 46% 
of ‘Task execution incomplete’; and 21% of ‘Task executed too late’ (Figure 1 and Table 
1). There are including 11 questions (Q42 to Q52) related to errors occurred at this 
stage, each operational step over 40% either by ‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 2. 
Aircraft B with three pitch modes can be selected during go-around: VNAV (Vertical 
navigation), V/S (Vertical speed), and FLCH SPD (Flight level change speed). VNAV 
is full automation function and connected with FMC (Flight management computer). 
When VNAV switch is selected aircraft will commence climb or descent 
automatically. Pushing V/S switch opens the vertical speed window and displays the 
current vertical speed. Pitch commands maintain IAS/MACH window airspeed or 
Mach. Pushing FLCH SPD switch opens the IAS/MACH window and displays 
command speed. Pitch commands maintain IAS/MACH window airspeed or Mach. 
PFDs provide clear and easy-to-read pitch mode information when pilot pressed any 
pitch mode switches. When executing miss approach procedures, there is a specific 
requested altitude should be followed. If aircraft deviates from ATC require altitude, it 
may cause near miss which will lead to ATC violation or air collision.  PF uses pitch 
modes (VNAV, V/S, or FLCH SPD) to maintain proper pitch attitude. PM monitors 
closely. When autopilot is engaged, PF selects a Pitch Mode of VNAV, V/S, or FLCH 
SPD. When flying manually, PF calls out “VNAV”, “V/S”, or “FLCH SPD” and PM 
selects the commanded pitch mode for crew task sharing. The common errors 
identified at this stage as followings, late or forget to engage VNAV on time will 
cause aircraft unable to capture the climbing path, it may cause aircraft level at 
improper altitude; pressed the wrong switch such as THR won’t cause any problem, it 
will delay the right timing of selecting the correct pitch; VNAV is disengaged by 
mistake, it should be reengaged right away in order to get back to the correct climbing 
path.  Pilots should closely monitor the change of annunciation. If aircraft is deviated 
from target altitude, pilot should correct it immediately. Junior pilots tent to make 
excessive corrections. Excessive corrections for small deviations on pitch control 
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usually happens when pilots either not familiar with automation system or control too 
roughly. Excessive miss approach altitude will cause serious problem. It is usually 
caused by wrong data input to FMC or wrong altitude setting on MCP. It is important 
to monitor the altitude at appropriate time in order to avoid ATC violation. 
 
The final operational step 1.8 Follow M/A Procedure shows there were 50% of ‘Task 
execution incomplete’; 25% of ‘Task executed in wrong direction’; and 30% of ‘Task 
executed too late’ (Figure 1 and Table 1).  There are including 13 questions (Q53 to 
Q65) related to errors occurred at this stage, each operational step over 40% either by 
‘ME’ or ‘OTHER’ shown as Table 2. Missed Approach is an instrument flight rules 
procedure which is a standard segment of an instrument approach. Generally, if the 
pilot in command determines by the time the aircraft is at the decision height (for a 
precision approach) or missed approach point (for a non-precision approach), that the 
runway or its environment is not in sight, or that a safe landing cannot be 
accomplished for any reason, the landing approach must be discontinued and the 
missed approach procedure must be initiated immediately. The missed approach 
procedure normally includes an initial heading or track and altitude to climb to, 
typically followed by holding instructions at a nearby navigation fix. The pilot is 
expected to inform ATC by radio of the initiation of the missed approach as soon as 
possible. At this stage, PF controls the aircraft with published missed approach 
procedure, PM informs ATC by radio.  Before pressing altitude control selector, PF 
should verify correct altitude selected on MCP. If aircraft maintains at the wrong 
altitude may cause ATC violation or air collision.  Decision Height is the lowest 
altitude aircraft can fly to until runway insight in order to prevent aircraft fly into 
unsafe area. PF should decide to make go-around if runway not insight at the 
approach minimums, and PM should call Approaching Minimums to remind PF to 
make judgment. Not prepared for go around when approaching Minimums is a serious 
mistake for pilot. Miss the timing of making go-around decision may cause aircraft fly 
into terrain and it is very dangerous, on the other hand, pilots decide to go-around 
before reaching Minimums is a safe operation but the timing of making such decision 
too early will consume time and fuel. Pilots have high work load during go-around 
and is possible to fail monitoring ATC clearances and cause serious problem. Using 
auto-flight system can reduce pilots’ workload. It’s a good decision to use auto-flight 
system when available and is appropriated during go-around. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In terms of feasibility and precision, together with previous data of incidents/ 
Li, Hsu, Chang, Wang & Harris                                                         15 
accidents and the studies of human factor engineering, HET is the appropriate 
technique to conduct error prediction for flight safety. By the use of a scientific 
approach using HTA to evaluate current SOPs design together with error analysis, 
interface layout and procedure certification, the flight safety will be enhanced and a 
user-friendly task environment can be achieved. This research requires the 
identification of the errors that were being made on the flight deck of Aircraft B 
during go-around.  There are two hardware designed induced human errors been 
identified by the method of Human Error Identification, the first issue is the design of 
TO/GA switches and Auto-thrust Disengage switches on Aircraft B are very close to 
one another; pilots may accidentally press the wrong switch. Auto-thrust Disengage 
switch will disengage auto-thrust system which means thrust system needs to be 
operated manually. When TO/GA switch is pushed, thrust system will provide thrust 
to lift the aircraft. If accidentally pushes the Auto-thrust Disengage switch instead, no 
thrust will be provided.  Either way will cause irretrievable consequences. The 
second issue is HDG (Heading) knob and IAS (Indicator Air Speed) knob are located 
close to each other. Some pilots get mix up easily. Fortunately, when pilot mistakenly 
turns IAS knob to adjust heading, it will be easy to detect because the heading display 
would not change. On the other hand, if pilot mistakenly turns HDG knob to adjust 
airspeed, it is also easy to detect because of the change of heading.   
 
It has to be mentioned that software design, hardware design, training design, and 
ecology design may have impact to pilots’ performance.  Although most types of 
human errors occurred in the cockpit were investigated that cannot explicitly be 
linked to incidents or accidents because of the paucity of the data in the investigation 
reports, and the errors also represent daily issues for pilots as they make these 
mistakes, which they then have to correct. This research finds that there are three 
types of errors with high likelihood committed by pilots during performing go-around, 
‘Fail to execute’; ‘Task execution incomplete’; and ‘Task executed too late’.  Therefore, 
there is a raising need to investigate further impact to flight safety for such errors 
occurred.  Many of the errors that were found were the types of errors that most 
pilots were aware of and have simply had to accept on the flight deck. It is hoped that 
human factors certification standards would help to ensure that many of these errors 
are not included on future aircraft.  
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